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Labor Market Adjustment to Globalization:





The increasing globalization of production and trade in the last 25 years has
required substantial adjustment of employment relationships in the United States
and Japan. Worker attachment to ﬁrms has always been lower in the U.S. than
in Japan, and this is reﬂected in a diﬀerence in institutions. As both the U.S.
and Japan have been faced with similar global competitive pressures, ﬁrms in
the two countries have responded in ways that are consistent with their histories,
institutions, and demographics. Firms in the United States have laid oﬀ workers,
even those in long-term primary jobs. Firms in Japan have taken the approach
of reassigning workers to other, perhaps lesser, jobs, seconding workers to other
ﬁrms, and making more use of part-time and secondary jobs. The result of
this diﬀerence in strategies is that the Japanese-U.S. gap in worker attachment
to ﬁrms has widened, particularly for males. Interestingly, the Japanese labor
market has made increased use of part-time and other non-standard workers,
particularly for females, to an extent not seen in the United States
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Tokyo Japan, September 14, 2006. I thank Silvia Barcellos for ﬁrst-rate research assistance.1 Introduction
The increasing globalization of production and trade in the last 25 years has required sub-
stantial adjustment of employment relationships in the United States and Japan. In the U.S.,
this resulted in a wave of corporate restructuring and “downsizing” in the 1980s that contin-
ues today. These events cost many workers their jobs, and these job losers bore substantial
costs in the form of non-employment and lower earnings among the re-employed (Farber
2005). At the same time, employment in the United States has grown steadily. Civilian
employment in the U.S. was 106.2 million in 1984 and rose to 142.8 million in 2005.1 Thus,
more than 35 million jobs have been created on net in the past 21 years, for an average rate
of employment growth of 1.4 percent per year over this period.
Despite this record of sustained growth in employment in the United States, there is
longstanding concern that the quality of the stock of jobs in the economy more generally
is deteriorating. The concern about job quality is based in part on the fact that the share
of employment that is in manufacturing has been declining over a long period of time.2
This has led to the view that, as high-quality manufacturing jobs are lost, perhaps to import
competition, they are being replaced by low-quality service sector jobs (so-called hamburger-
ﬂipping jobs). The high-quality jobs are characterized by relatively high wages, full-time
employment, substantial fringe beneﬁts, and, perhaps most importantly, substantial job
security (low rates of turnover). The low-quality jobs are characterized disproportionately
by relatively low wages, part-time employment, an absence of fringe beneﬁts, and low job
security (high rates of turnover).
The perceived low quality of many newly-created jobs fuels the concern that the nature of
employment relationships in the U.S. is changing from one based on long-term full-time em-
ployment to one based on more short-term and casual employment. There has been concern
that employers are moving toward greater reliance on temporary workers, on subcontractors,
and on part-time workers.3 Potential motivation for employers to implement such changes
range from a need for added ﬂexibility in the face of greater uncertainty regarding product
demand to avoidance of increasingly expensive fringe beneﬁts and long-term obligations to
workers. The general concern arises from the belief that these changes result in lower quality
1 These statistics are taken from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Series ID LNS12000000. This is the
civilian employment level derived from the Current Population Survey for workers aged 16 and older.
2 The manufacturing share of employment has been falling for over ﬁfty years. Manufacturing’s share
was 33.8 percent in 1950 and fell to 10.9 percent in 2004, 31.0 percent in 1960, 23.4 percent in 1970, and
15.8 percent in 1980. (President’s Council of Economic Advisers, 1996, Table B-42; President’s Council of
Economic Advisers, 2005, Table B-45.
3 In fact, there is relatively little evidence that the incidence of these alternative employment relationships
have increased greatly in the U.S. See XXXX.
1(lower paying and less secure) jobs for the average worker.
There are similarities and diﬀerences between between the Japanese The 1990s saw a
collapse in Japanese asset prices and slower economic growth. An interesting question is how
the Japanese labor market adjusted in response to these pressures. In contrast to the United
States, the employment growth generally has been much slower in Japan. Employment in
Japan increased from 57.7 million in 1984 to 63.6 million in 2005, for an average rate of
employment growth of 0.45 percent per year (OECD). This diﬀerence in employment growth
rates reﬂects in part the much lower population growth rate in Japan. This is a result of
two factors. First, Japanese birth rate is lower than the U.S. Birth rate. In XXXX, the
Japanese birth rate was XX percent while the U.S. birth rate YY percent. Second, there
are diﬀerences in the role of immigration in the two countries. The U.S., while far from
completely open to immigration, has experienced substantial and increasing immigration in
recent years. The foreign-born accounted for 7.9 percent of the U.S. population in 1990 and
11.1 percent of the U.S. population in 2000. (U.S. Census, 2003). In contrast, immigration
is much lower in Japan. As of the end of 2000, registered immigrants accounted for only 1.3
percent of the total Japanese population (Kashiwazaki, 2002).
Rebick (2005) presents a detailed examination of how the Japanese labor market is ad-
justing in many dimensions to new global economic realities, and I do not attempt to match
the breadth of his analysis. Given my earlier work on long-term employment in the U.S.
(e.g., Farber 2006), I do try, in this more limited dimension, to provide some perspective on
how employment relationsips in the United States and Japan have adjusted to the changing
world economy. Indeed, the role of “life-time jobs” has been highlighted as an important
institutional, economic, and even cultural diﬀerence between the two countries, and it is
worthwhile to understand the degree to which this diﬀerence is real and the extent to which
these relationships are changing.
My analysis begins with a detailed examination of U.S. individual-level data on job tenure
from the Current Population Survey (CPS).4 Unfortunately, I cannot carry out a comparable
analysis for Japan due to restrictions on the availability of Japanese individual-level data.
However, I am able to carry out some comparisons using published tabular and aggregate
data on job tenure for Japan.
The results are clear cut. There has historically been more long-term employment in
Japan than in the U.S. Over the last twenty-ﬁve years, job tenure has declined in the United
States while remaining stable or even increasing somewhat in Japan, increasing the “tenure
gap” between the two countries. More speciﬁcally, age-speciﬁc overall mean tenure has fallen
4 There is a substantial literature on changes in job tenure in the U.S. See Hall (1982), Ureta (1992),
Diebold, Polsky, and Neumark (1996) and Swinnerton and Wial (1995, 1996), Farber (2000), Neumark
(2000), Stevens (2005), and Farber (2006).
2substantially in the U.S., particularly for workers over forty years of age. These declines are
sharper for men than for women, as there has been a secular increase in the attachment
of women to the labor force in the U.S. There appears to be no such changes over time in
measures of tenure for workers in Japan.
The Japanese economy appears to have adjusted in other ways to changes in the global
economy. In particular, Japanese employers appear to be making increased use of part-time
workers, especially women, while there has been no such trend in the United States.5
2 “Careers” in the U.S. and Japan
A characterization of the dynamics of a typical American worker’s employment history over
the course of a working life (a “career”) is that a worker enters the labor market at some
point after concluding schooling and holds a succession of jobs in the ensuing decades. Com-
monly, it is understood that, after some turnover early in careers, most workers ﬁnd a job
(relationship with an employer) that lasts for a long period of time (a “life-time” job). This
structure exists in the context of a strong “employment-at-will” legal doctrine which permits
either workers or employers to end an employment relationship “for good cause, bad cause,
or no cause at all.” While some limitations to the employment-at-will doctrine have been
adopted (notably anti-discrimination laws), the doctrine is alive and well in the U.S.
This conception of a career culminating in a life-time job in the U.S. has been challenged
in the last ﬁfteen to twenty years, both in academic research and in the media, as large
corporations have engaged in highly publicized layoﬀs and the industrial structure of the
U.S. economy has shifted in the face of global competitive pressures. To the extent that
there has been a substantial change in career employment dynamics, young workers entering
the labor force in recent years and in the future will face a very diﬀerent type of career than
did earlier cohorts.
A characterization of the dynamics of a typical Japanese worker’s employment history
over the course of a working life (a “career”) is roughly similar with some important diﬀer-
ences. A Japanese worker enters the labor market after concluding schooling and quickly
ﬁnds a job (relationship with an employer) that lasts until retirement. One contrast with
the U.S. is that there appears to be less “job-shopping” earlier in careers so that long-term
employment begins at an earlier age in Japan. Additionally, a higher fraction of Japanese
workers at virtually every age appear to be in long-term employment relationships. In
5 Rebick (2005, p. 114) reports that 19.3 percent of employed women in Japan worked part-time in 1980
while fully 39.7 percent worked part-time in 2002. In contrast, my tabulations of the Current Population
Survey for the U.S. shows that 22.6 percent of employed women in the U.S worked part-time in 1981 while
20.9 percent worked part-time in 2002.
3contrast to the strong employment-at-will doctrine in the U.S., most workers (those in “reg-
ular” jobs) in the Japanese labor market enjoy strong employment protection resulting from
Japanese case labor law and company practices (Rebick, 2005).
As in the U.S., the view of the typical Japanese employment relationship as involving little
mobility and “lifetime” employment has been challenged, although there has been little direct
evidence supporting this view (Chuma, 1998). Rebick (2005) makes an important distinction
between regular and non-regular workers. Regular workers are those on indeﬁnite contracts
and who have implicit or explicit employment protection. Non-regular workers are those
on ﬁxed-term contracts, usually less than one year. The quality of non-regular employment
is generally inferior to that of regular employment. And to the extent the composition of
Japanese employment has shifted from regular workers to non-regular workers, there is, as
in the U.S. concern regarding a decline in the quality of jobs.
An interesting institutional contrast between Japan and the U.S. that appears to reverse
the common view of the diﬀerence in the importance of lifetime jobs is in retirement policy.
Mandatory retirement policies, which prevent employers from forcing workers to leave jobs
at retirement age are illegal in the U.S. However, there are set retirement ages in Japanese
companies that seem low in the U.S. context. While the age at retirement in many jobs in
Japan has increased in the last twenty years from 50 or 55 to 60, retirement from a lifetime
job in Japan typically has occurred at a lower age than in the U.S. It may be that an
important factor that allows Japanese Farmer to oﬀer “lifetime jobs” is that “job lifetimes”
end at a relatively early age.
3 Trends in Long-Term Employment in the U.S.
3.1 The CPS Data on Employer Tenure
Data on how long workers have been with their current employer is available in machine-
readable form in mobility supplements to the CPS in January or February of 1973, 1978, 1981,
1983, 1987, 1991, and in even years from 1996-2004. These supplements contain information
on how long workers have been continuously employed by their current employer, and they
are asked of all eight CPS rotation groups. Information on job durations is also available
in pension and beneﬁt supplements to the CPS in May of 1979, 1981, 1983, and 1988,
and in April 1993. These supplements contain information on how long workers have been
working for their current employer, and they are asked of four of the eight CPS rotation
groups. Finally, information on job durations is available in the continuous and alternative
employment arrangement supplements (CAEAS) to the CPS in February of 1995, 1997, 1999,
2001, and 2005. In total there are twenty CPS supplements with information on employer
4tenure available in machine readable form over the period from 1973 to 2005, and my analysis
relies on these data.6
With the exception of jobs of less than one year, all of the supplements before the
February 1996 mobility supplement collect data on job duration in integer form reporting
the number of years employed. For jobs of less than one year, the mobility supplements
report the number of months employed while the pension and beneﬁt supplements report
only the fact that the job was less than one year old. The February 1996 and later mobility
supplement ask workers how long they have worked continuously for their current employer
and accepts a numerical response where the worker speciﬁes the time units. The 1995-2005
CAEAS ask workers how long they have worked for their current employer and accepts a
numerical response where the worker speciﬁes the time units. Virtually all workers in jobs
even ﬁve years old and all workers in jobs 10 years old or longer, report job durations in
years.
One reasonable interpretation of the integer report of the number of years is that workers
round to the nearest integer when they report jobs of duration of at least one year.7 For
example, a response of 10 years would imply tenure greater than or equal to 9.5 years and less
than 10.5 years. In order to create a smooth tenure variable, I assume that the distribution
of job tenure is uniform in these one-year intervals. Given a reported tenure of T years, I
replace T by T − 0.5 + u where u is a random variable distributed uniformly on the unit
interval.8
My sample consists of 826,842 not self employed workers aged 20-64 from the 20 CPS
supplements covering the period from 1973 to 2005. The self-employed are not included
because the concept of employer tenure is less clear for the self-employed, and, in any case,
the CPS supplements do not contain consistent information on tenure for the self-employed.
3.2 Measuring the Change in Tenure Over Time
I organize my analysis of changes over time in the distribution of job durations by examining
age-speciﬁc values of various distributional measures for diﬀerent birth cohorts. I restrict my
sample to workers aged 20-64, and my samples cover the period from 1973 to 2005. I classify
6 In Farber (2006), I describe these data and their limitations in more detail. I also present a review of
the recent literature on job stability in the U.S..
7 This ignores the heaping of the tenure distribution at multiples of ﬁve and ten years.
8 Where reported tenure is zero years, I assume that tenure is uniformly distributed between zero and
one and deﬁne tenure as u. Given that jobs are more likely to end earlier in the ﬁrst year than later in the
ﬁrst year, this is not completely accurate (Farber, 1994). However, the measures used in my analysis will
not be aﬀected by this representation. Where reported tenure is exactly one year, I assume that true tenure
is uniformly distributed between 1 and 1.5 and deﬁne tenure as 1 + u/2.
5Table 1: Distribution of Age by Birth Cohort
Birth Decade N Mean SD MIN MAX
1914-19 12016 59.32 3.18 54 64
1920-29 50797 54.74 4.90 44 64
1930-39 85342 50.51 7.85 34 64
1940-49 172705 45.77 9.60 24 64
1950-59 234349 38.37 8.82 20 55
1960-69 167798 32.68 5.98 20 45
1970-80 91915 25.90 3.71 20 35
All 814922 38.97 11.33 20 64
Note: Based on data for not self employed workers 20-64 years of age from
20 CPSs covering the period from 1973 to 2005. Weighted by CPS ﬁnal
sample weights.
workers by year of birth, and I limit my analysis to birth cohorts for which the earliest and
latest observations are at least ﬁve calendar years apart. As a result, my sample includes
workers born between 1914 and 1980.9 In order to summarize these data, I classify workers
by decade of birth, classifying workers born in 1980 (aged 25 in 2005, the last sampled year)
as belonging to the 1970s birth cohort. My analysis sample includes workers born in the
seven decades from the 1910s through the 1970s. Table 1 contains summary statistics on
age by decade of birth. The earliest birth cohorts have predominantly older workers and
the more recent birth cohorts have predominantly younger workers. No single birth cohort
covers the entire age spectrum.
No one statistic can completely characterize a distribution, and I focus on several mea-
sures here:
• Mean job tenure (years with the current employer). Note that this is not mean job
duration since since the jobs sampled are still in progress.
• The age-speciﬁc probability that a worker reports being on their job at least ten years.
Because younger workers cannot have accumulated substantial job tenure, I restrict
9 Workers born in the 1909-1913 period were sampled in 1973 but in no other years. Workers born
between 1981 and 1985 were sampled in diﬀerent CPSs between 2000 and 2005, but none ﬁve years apart.
Elimination of workers in these birth cohorts results in the elimination of 2894 individuals born between
1909 and 1913 (0.35 percent of the overall sample) and 9026 individuals born between 1981 and 1985 (1.09
percent of the overall sample). Individuals from the early cohorts who were eliminated are ages 60-64 at
the time of sampling. Individuals from the late cohorts who were eliminated are ages 20-24 at the time of
sampling.
6this analysis to workers at least 35 years of age, and I examine how these probabilities
have evolved from early to more recent birth cohorts. Based on the statistics in table
1, there are workers aged 35 and older in my sample born in the six decades from the
1910s to the 1960s.
• The age-speciﬁc probability that a worker reports being in their job at least twenty
years. Because younger workers cannot have accumulated substantial job tenure, I
restrict this analysis to workers 45 years of age and older, and I examine how these
probabilities have evolved from early- to mid-twentieth century birth cohorts. Based
on the statistics in table 1, there are workers aged 45 and older in my sample born in
the ﬁve decades from the 1910s to the 1950s.
An important measurement issue is related to cyclical changes in the composition of the
sample. It is clear that workers with little seniority are more likely than high-tenure workers
to lose their jobs in downturns (Abraham and Medoﬀ, 1984). Thus, we would expect that
the incidence of long-term important employment, as measured by the fraction of workers
with tenure exceeding some threshold, to be counter-cyclical. Tight labor markets will lead
the distribution of job durations to lie to the left of the distribution in slack labor markets.
Since secular rather than cyclical changes are of interest here, an alternative measure of the
distribution that is relatively free of cyclical movements would be useful.
A potential alternative would be to use the entire population in the relevant category
(e.g., individuals in a given age range) regardless of employment status assuming that those
not employed have zero tenure (Farber, 1998). One could compute median tenure and popu-
lation fractions in diﬀerent tenure categories using these population-based data. While these
population-based measures do not suﬀer to the same degree from the cyclical ﬂuctuations
that aﬀect the employment-based measures, they have their own problems of interpretation.
Secular changes in labor supply directly aﬀect the population-based measures. If a group
has increased its labor supply over time (e.g., as women have done), the population-based
measures of the incidence of long-term employment for that group are likely to be aﬀected
in hard-to-predict ways. For example, if women are less likely to leave the labor force after
some initial period working, then there is likely to be an increase in the fraction of women in
long-term employment relationships. Similarly, if a group has decreased its labor supply over
time (e.g., as older men have done), the population-based measures for that group are likely
to show a decrease in the incidence of long-term employment. Changes in population-based
measures due to shifts in labor supply do not reﬂect changes in the underlying structure of
jobs.
I choose to present employment-based measures in this study in order to avoid confusing
secular changes in labor supply behavior with changes in the structure of jobs. But cyclical
inﬂuences need to be kept in mind when interpreting the results.
73.3 Mean Tenure
Figure 1 contains separate plots by sex of mean tenure by age for the ﬁve decade-of-birth
cohorts from the 1920s through the 1960s.10 These ﬁgures show clearly that 1) mean tenure
is rising with age and 2) women have lower mean tenure than men after about age 30. With
regard to shifts over time in the tenure distribution, age-speciﬁc mean tenure for males has
declined substantially, particularly for older workers. For example mean tenure for males at
age 50 declined from 13.4 years for the 1930s birth cohort to 11.9 years for the 1950s birth
cohort. There appears to be little systematic change for women.
It is not necessarily the case that classifying individuals by birth decade is appropriate.
There may be important diﬀerences within decade, particularly with regard to the age dis-
tribution. Another approach to summarizing the data that allows each birth year to be
independent is to estimate a linear model of the natural logarithm of tenure of the form
ln(Tijk) = Cj + Ak + ijk, (1)
where Tijk is tenure in years for individual i in birth cohort j aged k, Cj is a birth year
indicator, and Ak is a years-of-age indicator. This logarithmic speciﬁcation embodies the
plausible implicit assumption that proportional cohort eﬀects on mean tenure are constant
across ages and, equivalently, that the proportional age eﬀects on mean tenure are constant
across birth cohorts.11 A more detailed investigation would allow for cohort eﬀects that vary
by age since changes in job security could express themselves diﬀerentially at various ages.
However, the model in equation 1 ﬁts the data quite well, and it serves as a good summary
of the data.12
I estimate the model in equation 1 separately for men and women using ordinary least
squares (OLS), weighted by the CPS ﬁnal sample weights. The estimated cohort eﬀects on
mean tenure, normalized at zero for the 1914 birth cohort, are converted to proportional
diﬀerences in mean tenure relative to the 1914 birth cohort as exp( ˆ Cj − ˆ C1914) − 1. These
proportional diﬀerences are plotted in ﬁgure 2, and they show a sharp decline of almost
10 Means are calculated weighted by CPS ﬁnal sample weights. The 1914-1919 and the 1970s birth cohorts
are omitted for clarity of presentation and because of the narrow range of ages covered by these cohorts. See
1.
11 I do not estimate this model using absolute tenure because the implicit assumption in that case would
be that absolute cohort eﬀects on mean tenure are constant across ages and, equivalently, that absolute age
eﬀects on mean tenure are constant across birth cohorts. This is clearly not plausible on inspection of ﬁgure
1, given the fact that younger workers have very low levels of tenure.
12 I computed (separately for men and women) weighted mean tenure for each age/birth-year combination
and regressed these measures on a complete set of age and birth year ﬁxed eﬀects. This is essentially the
main-eﬀects model in equation 1 aggregated to the cell level. The R-squared from this regression is 0.98 for












































































































Proportional Difference from 1914 Birth Cohort, Mean Tenure
Control for Age
Figure 2: Proportional Diﬀerence from 1914 Birth Cohort, Mean Tenure, Controlling for
Age.
50 percent in age-speciﬁc mean tenure for male workers between the 1914 and 1980 birth
cohorts.
The time-series pattern is quite diﬀerent for female workers. Age-speciﬁc mean tenure
for female workers did not change between the 1914 and 1940 birth cohorts, but it increased
by about 15 percent between the 1940 and 1960 birth cohorts before declining to its original
level by the 1970 birth cohort. The increase in mean tenure for women between the 1940
and 1960 birth cohorts reﬂects the increased commitment of women to the labor force for
women born in this period tempered by 1) high rates of withdrawal from the labor force, even
if only for a short time, in the child-bearing years and 2) the general decline in long-term
employment opportunities apparent in the data for males. The subsequent decline in tenure
for females may reﬂect a general decline in long-term employment opportunities that is not
oﬀset by a further increase in female commitment to the labor force.
In addition to the increased presence of women in the labor force, there are other impor-
tant changes that could be related to the decline in mean tenure. First is the well-known
large increase in average educational attainment during the 20th century summarized in
10Table 2: Distribution of Education by Birth Cohort
(Row Percentage in Education Category)
Birth Decade ED < 12 ED = 12 ED 13-15 ED ≥ 16
1914-19 39.53 37.54 10.92 12.02
1920-29 31.18 39.30 12.83 16.69
1930-39 21.28 40.57 16.57 21.58
1940-49 11.91 35.77 22.95 29.37
1950-59 8.46 33.96 27.33 30.26
1960-69 8.80 33.46 27.73 30.02
1970-80 8.64 28.60 29.68 33.08
All 12.28 34.76 24.56 28.40
Note: Based on data for not self employed workers 20-64 years of age from
20 CPSs covering the period from 1973 to 2005. Weighted by CPS ﬁnal
sample weights.
table 2.13 In order to assess whether changes in the educational composition of the labor
force can account for the decline in mean tenure, I estimate an augmented version of the
regression model for mean tenure in equation 1 as
ln(Tijk) = EDiγ + Cj + Ak + ijk, (2)
where EDi is a vector of dummy variables indicating educational attainment and γ is a
vector of associated coeﬃcients. This provides a summary across educational categories of
the proportional change in mean tenure relative to the 1914 birth cohort ( exp( ˆ Cj− ˆ C1914)−1)
controlling for changes in the educational distribution over time. These estimates are plotted
in ﬁgure 3, and, while they are very similar in shape to those derived without controlling for
education (ﬁgure 2), there are some diﬀerences. Accounting for changes in the distribution
of education, the estimated decline in mean tenure for males was approximately 40 percent
between the 1914 and 1975 cohorts compared to a 50 percent decline when education is not
controlled for. I conclude that about 20 percent of the decline in tenure for males between the
1914 and 1975 cohorts is due to a change in the distribution of education. When education
is accounted for, women show no increase in mean tenure between the 1914 and 1960 cohorts
followed by a decline of about 10 percent between the 1960 and 1975 cohorts.
13 There is not a clear relationship between educational attainment and tenure. Mean tenure in my analysis
sample for each of the four educational categories are ED<12: 7.3 years, ED=12: 7.4 years, ED 13-15: 6.5
years, and ED ≥ 16: 7.3 years. In Farber (2006), I investigate whether the changes in the tenure distribution




















































Proportional Difference from 1914 Birth Cohort, Mean Tenure
Control for Age and Education
Figure 3: Proportional Diﬀerence from 1914 Birth Cohort, Mean Tenure. Controlling for
Age and Education.
A second and potentially more important factor that could account for the decline in
tenure is the increased presence of immigrants in the U.S. labor force. By deﬁnition, newly
arrived immigrants cannot have substantial tenure. Data on immigration are not available
in any CPS with tenure data prior to 1995, and I begin my investigation using data from
the 10 CPSs with tenure and immigration data between 1995 and 2005. In order to have
data for each birth cohort over a ﬁve calendar year period, I further restrict my analysis
to the 1935-1980 birth cohorts. The weighted immigrant fraction of the labor force in
my sample increased steadily from 9.45 percent in 1995 to 14.1 percent in 2005. In every
year, immigrants had about 2.1 years lower tenure than natives on average (overall average
diﬀerence = 2.14 years (s.e. = 0.036)). Immigrants are only slightly younger than natives
(overall average diﬀerence = 0.94 years (s.e. = 0.053)).
The key question is how much of the decline in observed tenure is due to the increased
immigrant presence in the labor force. In order to address this question, I re-estimated the
basic model including an indicator for immigrant status (=1 if immigrant). This model is
ln(Tijk) = αIMMi + EDiγ + Cj + Ak + ijk, (3)
12Table 3: Proportion Immigrants by Race and Hispanic Ethnicity, 1995-2005
Year All White Nonwhite All White Nonwhite
NonHisp NonHisp Hisp Hisp Hisp
1995 0.095 0.030 0.187 0.506 0.509 0.492
1996 0.100 0.032 0.226 0.494 0.493 0.510
1997 0.109 0.032 0.232 0.516 0.518 0.484
1998 0.117 0.035 0.240 0.517 0.516 0.526
1999 0.111 0.033 0.222 0.495 0.498 0.448
2000 0.121 0.038 0.239 0.517 0.514 0.585
2001 0.129 0.039 0.261 0.522 0.520 0.557
2002 0.130 0.040 0.270 0.528 0.527 0.543
2004 0.142 0.042 0.280 0.531 0.538 0.439
2005 0.141 0.037 0.275 0.538 0.545 0.439
All 0.119 0.036 0.244 0.517 0.519 0.495
Note: Based on data for not self employed workers 20-64 years of age from
10 CPSs covering the period from 1995 to 2005. Weighted by CPS ﬁnal
sample weights. N=418,178.
where IMMi is an indicator variable if worker i is an immigrant. The estimates of the
immigrant eﬀect on mean log tenure (α) is -0.247 (s.e. = 0.006) for males and -0.218 (s.e. =
0.007) for females, verifying that immigrants have substantially lower tenure than do natives.
The proportional diﬀerences relative to the 1935 birth cohort from a base model without the
immigrant variable (equation 2) are plotted in the top panel of ﬁgure 4. The bottom panel
of this ﬁgure contains the proportional diﬀerences in mean tenure from the model with the
immigrant variable (equation 3).
The base model shows a 30 percent decline in age-speciﬁc tenure for male workers between
the 1935 and 1975 birth cohorts. When immigrant status is controlled for, the decline in
tenure for males between these birth cohorts is 25 percent. A similar pattern emerges for
females, with a decline of 18 percent without a control for immigrant status and a decline of
15 percent with a control for immigrant status. Overall, it appears that only about about
one-sixth of the decline in age-speciﬁc tenure between the 1935 and 1975 birth cohorts is
due to an increase in immigration.
This analysis is incomplete in that it does not use information on the 21 birth cohorts
between 1914 and 1934 due to the lack of data on immigration status prior to 1995. However,
immigrant status is strongly correlated with race and Hispanic ethnicity, which is observed
in all years. Table 3 contains the immigrant proportion by race and Hispanic ethnicity
for the 1995-2005 CPS data. The overall immigrant proportion of workers rose from 9.5
percent in 1995 to 14.1 percent in 2005. These immigrants are highly concentrated among

















































Proportional Difference from 1935 Birth Cohort, Mean Tenure

















































Proportional Difference from 1935 Birth Cohort, Mean Tenure
Control for Age, Education, and Immigrant Status
Figure 4: Proportional Diﬀerence from 1935 Birth Cohort, Mean Tenure. Controlling for
Age and Education. (Immigrant Status Controlled in Bottom Panel).
14about ﬁfty percent of Hispanics (white and nonwhite) are immigrants.14 Additionally, a
growing fraction of nonwhite non-Hispanics are immigrants, rising from 18.7 percent in 1995
to about 28 percent by 2004. The rising overall immigrant share over this period is reﬂected
in the growing share of Hispanics and nonwhites in the labor force. The Hispanic share of
employment in my sample increased from 9.0 percent in 1995 to 13.0 percent in 2005 and
the nonwhite share of employment increased from 15.2 percent to 17.2 percent over the same
period.
On this basis, I estimate age-speciﬁc proportional diﬀerences in mean tenure relative to
the 1914 birth cohort using the 1973-2005 sample for the 1914-1980 birth cohorts controlling
for race and ethnicity as well as age and education. This allows me to at least partly account
for the role of increased immigration in the decline in tenure. I derive the birth cohort eﬀects
by estimating
ln(Tijk) = α1NWi + α2Hi + EDiγ + Cj + Ak + ijk, (4)
where NWi is an indicator for nonwhite and Hi is an indicator for Hispanic ethnicity.
Figure 5 contains separate plots for males and females of the proportional diﬀerences
from the 1914 birth cohort in mean tenure based on equation 4. The estimated diﬀerences
for males show a decline in age-speciﬁc tenure of about 32 percent between the 1914 and
1975 birth cohorts. This contrasts with an estimated decline over the same period of about
36 percent when there are no controls for race and Hispanic ethnicity (ﬁgure 3). Thus,
only about 10 percent of the decline in tenure is related to changes in racial and ethnic
composition. This is likely a lower bound on the eﬀect of increased immigration.15 The
pattern for females in ﬁgure 5 is very similar to that obtained when race and Hispanic
ethnicity are not accounted for (ﬁgure 3). Age speciﬁc tenure for females peaks for cohorts
born in the mid-1950s and declines about by 12 percent subsequently.
3.4 Long-Term Employment
Long-term employment is common in the U.S. Labor Market. During the 1973-2005 period,
49.4 percent of employed males and 37.2 percent of employed females aged 40-64 report
having been with their current employer for at least ten years. Over the same period, 33.3
percent of employed males and 18.1 percent of employed females aged 50-64 report having
been with their current employer for at least twenty years. However, the declines in age-
speciﬁc mean tenure presented in the preceding sub-section are also apparent in measures of
14 The rather sharp drop in the immigrant proportion among nonwhite Hispanics is due to the change in
the race identiﬁcation coding in the CPS in 2004.
15 Over the 1995-2205 period, where I have data on immigrant status, I estimated that increased immi-




















































Proportional Difference from 1914 Birth Cohort, Mean Tenure
Controls for Age, Education, Race, and Hispanic Ethnicity
Figure 5: Proportional Diﬀerence from 1914 Birth Cohort, Mean Tenure. Controlling for
Age, Education, Race, and Hispanic Ethnicity.
the age-speciﬁc incidence of long-term employment.
In order to investigate this, I consider two measures of long-term employment:
• the fraction of workers aged 35-64 who have been with their employer at least ten
years, and
• the fraction of workers aged 45-64 who have been with their employer at least twenty
years.
I estimate age-speciﬁc birth-cohort eﬀects using the same approach I used for mean tenure.
I estimate linear probability models using the same speciﬁcation of explanatory variables
(birth cohort, age, education, race, Hispanic ethnicity) in equation 4.
The top panel of ﬁgure 6 contains separate plots for males and females of the birth
cohort eﬀects (1914=0) from a linear probability model for the probability that a worker
has been with the same employer for ten or more years. Control variables include a set of
age ﬁxed eﬀects, education, race, and Hispanic ethnicity. The age-speciﬁc probability that a























































Difference from 1914 Birth Cohort, Pr(Tenure >= 10 years)




















































Difference from 1914 Birth Cohort, Pr(Tenure >= 20 years)
Controls for Age, Education, Race and Hispanic Ethnicity
Figure 6: Proportional Diﬀerence from 1914 Birth Cohort, Pr(T ≥ 10) and Pr(T ≥ 20) by
Birth Year. Controlling for Age, Education, Race, and Hispanic Ethnicity.
17percentage points between the 1914 and 1965 birth cohorts.16 The age-speciﬁc probability
that a female worker has been with her employer for at least ten years was constant between
the 1914 and 1940 birth cohorts and then increased slightly between the early 1940s and late
1950s cohorts before declining to its original level.
I repeat this analysis for the probability that workers aged 45-64 have been with their
employer at least twenty years. The bottom panel of ﬁgure 6 contains separate plots for
males and females of the birth cohort eﬀects (1914=0) from a linear probability model for
the probability that a worker has been with the same employer for twenty or more years.
As before, control variables include a set of age ﬁxed eﬀects, education, race, and Hispanic
ethnicity. The age-speciﬁc probability that a male worker has been with his employer for at
least twenty years fell sharply by almost 12 percentage points between the 1914 and 1955
birth cohorts.17 The age-speciﬁc probability that a female worker has been with her employer
for at least twenty years was fairly steady between the late 1910s and the mid-1930s birth
cohorts before rising through 1950.
3.5 Summary of U.S. Experience
Taken together, the analysis of the change in mean tenure across cohorts and the analysis of
the change in the likelihood of long-term employment across cohorts shows clearly that long-
term employment has become much less common for males and has not changed substantially
for females despite the dramatically increased commitment of females to the labor force over
the past half century. It appears that younger American workers will be less likely than their
parents to have a “life-time” job.
4 The Evolution of Job Tenure in Japan
Unfortunately, the lack of availability of individual-level data for the Japanese workforce
make it impossible for me to repeat my U.S. analysis for Japan. However, I do use published
tabulations and the results of other researchers to provide some evidence on changes in
Japanese job tenure. I also aggregate the CPS-based U.S. data to the same level in order to
provide direct comparisons.
16 I do not include any birth cohorts after 1965 because they have not been observed in my sample over
a ﬁve year period.
17 I do not include any birth cohorts after 1955 because they have not been observed in my sample over
a ﬁve year period.
184.1 Mean Tenure
Rebick (2005, p.38) presents data from the Japanese wage censuses (Ministry of Labour/Health,
Labour, and Welfare) on average tenure for full-time employees by 5-year age category at
three points in time (1977, 1988, and 2003) separately for males and females. I created
comparable data for the U.S. using the January 1978, May 1988, and January 2004 CPSs.
The top panel of ﬁgure 7 contains plots of these data for male workers in the U.S. and
Japan. There is a decline of 2.1 years in average tenure (from 16.3 years in 1978 to 14.2
years in 2004) for U.S. males in the 54-59 age category. The decline is smaller but apparent
at earlier ages. The trend in Japan is the opposite, with average tenure for 55-59 year old
Japanese males increasing by 9.6 years (from 13.2 years in 1977 to 22.8 years in 2003). This
trend begins for workers in their late thirties and increases rapidly. At least part of this
increase is likely due to the steady increase in the Japanese ﬁrms’ mandatory retirement
ages over the last thirty years.
There is an equally interesting contrast between the U.S. and Japan for women. The
bottom panel of ﬁgure 7 contains plots of the same data for female workers. There is
a relatively small increase in average tenure for older women in the U.S. over the period
studied of 1.6 years in average tenure (from 9.7 years in 1978 to 11.3 years in 2004) for
U.S. female in the 50-54 age category. There are smaller increases in other age groups. The
increase in tenure for Japanese women is quite dramatic, with average tenure for 55-59 year
old Japanese females increasing by 6.7 years (from 9.4 years in 1977 to 16.1 years in 2003).
This trend is apparent for Japanese women in virtually all age categories. Once again, at
least part of this increase in average tenure is likely due to the steady increase in the Japanese
ﬁrms’ mandatory retirement ages over the last thirty years. It may also be at least partly a
result of relatively recent public policies guaranteeing women non-discriminatory treatment
in the labor market.
4.2 Long-Term Employment
I use data from the Japanese Employment Status Surveys taken in 1979, 1982, 1987, 1992,
1997, and 2002 in order to investigate changes in the incidence of long-term employment.
The published tabulations from these surveys allow me to calculate the fraction of full-time
workers in speciﬁc age categories who have tenure levels in speciﬁc tenure categories. I use
these data to calculate 1) the fraction of workers aged 35-64 with at least ten years tenure,
2) the fraction of workers aged 35-64 with at least ﬁfteen years tenure, and 3) the fraction
of workers aged 55-64 with at least twenty years tenure. These are not the most satisfactory
breakdowns of age categories, but they are the only ones I could create with the available
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Figure 7: Average Tenure by Age Category, by Year and Sex
20the CPSs from January 1978, 1981, 1983, 1987, 1991, and 2002 along with the May 1983,
April 1993, and February 1997 CPSs.
The top panel of ﬁgure 8 contains plots of these data for male workers in the U.S. and
Japan. Not surprisingly, the rates of long-term employment are substantially higher in Japan
than in the U.S. in all time period, and these diﬀerences have been growing over time. There
is a clear decline in each of the three long-term employment fractions for U.S. males. For
example, the fraction of U.S. males aged 35-64 who had been with their employer for at least
ten years declined from 55.4 percent in 1979 to 44.0 percent in 2002. There is no trend in
the fraction of Japanese males aged 35-64 who had been with their employer for at least
ten years. Interestingly, there is a sharp increase between 1979 and 1997 in the fraction of
Japanese males aged 55-64 who had been with their employers for at least 20 years. This
fraction increased from 40.0 percent in 1979 to 57.7 percent in 1997 before declining to 53.9
percent by 2002. Once again, at least part of this increase is likely due to the steady increase
in the Japanese ﬁrms’ mandatory retirement ages over the last thirty years.
The rates of long-term employment for females, shown in the bottom panel of ﬁgure 8
are quite comparable for women in the U.S. and Japan. There has been very little movement
over time in any of the three measure for U.S. females. There has been a relatively small
increase over time for Japanese females. The largest of these is an increase in the fraction
of Japanese female workers between 35 and 64 years of ages with at least ten years tenure.
This fraction increased from 38.4 percent in 1979 to 44.6 percent in 2002.
4.3 A Note on Part-Time Employment
A caveat to the conclusions that average tenure for Japanese women has substantially in-
creased and that Japanese women have increased access to long-term jobs is that the rate of
part-time employment among Japanese women has skyrocketed, and the data on job tenure
that I rely on here is for full-time workers only. As I noted above, 19.3 percent of employed
women in Japan worked part-time in 1980 while fully 39.7 percent worked part-time in 2002
(Rebick, 2005). In contrast, my tabulations of the Current Population Survey for the U.S.
show that 22.6 percent of employed women in the U.S worked part-time in 1981 while 20.9
percent worked part-time in 2002. To the extent that part-time jobs oﬀer lower pay, job se-
curity, and beneﬁts, it is likely that part of the adjustment of Japanese ﬁrms to the changing
environment is to shift work to part-time positions. Rebick (2005, p. 59) reports that the
share of total employment (male and female) that is part-time increased form 12.6 percent
in 1990 to 19.1 percent in 2001. The comparable ﬁgures for the United States are 14.38
percent part-time in 1991 and 12.96 percent part-time in 2000.
The growth of part-time employment in Japan is relevant because part-time jobs, in both
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Figure 8: Fraction Long-Term Jobs, by Year and Sex
22reports that part-time workers in Japan in 2003 earned only 55 percent of the hourly earnings
of full-time workers. The full-time/part-time wage diﬀerential in the U.S. is not at large but
is substantial. Additionally, data from the U.S. indicate that job tenure is substantially lower
on part-time jobs.18
Taken together, the ﬁndings on job tenure and the Japanese trend in part-time work is
consistent with the view that the Japanese labor market is in fact adjusting by reducing the
incidence of “life-time” jobs by increasing the role of part-time employment. In contrast, the
U.S. labor market is adjusting by reducing the incidence of “lifetime” jobs among full-time
workers.
5 Concluding Remarks
There are many aspects of the Japanese labor market which I have not addressed. I have
implicitly ignored smaller ﬁrms in the institutional discussion and home-work and self-
employment, which are substantial but declining in Japan, are not measured. However,
the larger forces and trends that I highlight here and contrast with those in the U.S., I
believe illuminate important diﬀerences and some commonalities.
I conclude with the observation that worker attachment to ﬁrms has always been lower in
the U.S. than in Japan and that this is reﬂected in a diﬀerence in institutions. As both the
U.S. and Japan have been faced with similar global competitive pressures, ﬁrms in the two
countries have responded in ways that are consistent with their histories and institutions.
Firms in the U.S. have laid oﬀ workers, even those in long-term primary jobs. Reassignment
to other jobs within ﬁrms has not been an important phenomenon, and workers who lose
their jobs pay a real economic penalty in the form of unemployment and lower earnings
(Farber 2005). Firms in Japan have taken the approach of reassigning workers to other,
perhaps lesser, jobs, seconding workers to other ﬁrms, and making more use of part-time
and non-regular forms of employment. These reassignments are not fully reﬂected in data
on job tenure, but it is likely that many Japanese workers have suﬀered losses in economic
and social status as a result of the necessary adjustments.
Legal institutions, which are likely endogenous to other social and economic forces, may
be important factors in the diﬀerence in adjustment strategies between the U.S. and Japan.
The lack of mandatory retirement in the U.S. combined with a legal prohibition against
using age as a factor in layoﬀ decisions may mean that U.S. ﬁrms ﬁnd it eﬃcient to lay oﬀ
18 Using data from the CPS from 1973 through 2006 and accounting for calendar year and age, my estimate
is that, for men, average tenure is 30 percent lower on partime jobs than on full-time jobs. The diﬀerential
for women is 23.7 percent.
23workers at earlier ages in order to avoid an aging workforce with little room to hire fresh
workers. The stronger job protections for regular workers in Japan may make it eﬃcient for
Japanese employers to redesign jobs to use non-regular workers who are part-time and may
be on ﬁxed-term contracts.
In conclusion, each country’s strategy for dealing with the sharp changes in product and
labor demand caused by globalization reﬂects its history and institutions. Neither strategy
is without costs for the workers involved, and, as the pace of global change continues, these
costs are likely to increase. Indeed, it would not be surprising to see some convergence in
the structure of emplaoyment practices in the United States and Japan over time as both
economies continue to be subjected to common global forces.
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